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Abstract	  	  The	  idea	  of	  fMRI’s	  “seductive	  allure”	  rests	  on	  in	  two	  widely	  cited	  studies.	  	  Upon	  closer	  analysis	  of	  these	  studies,	  and	  in	  light	  of	  more	  recent	  research,	  we	  find	  little	  empirical	  support	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  brain	  images	  are	  inordinately	  influential.	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   As	  a	  tool	  for	  studying	  the	  human	  mind	  and	  brain,	  functional	  MRI	  has	  been	  subject	  to	  various	  criticisms.	  	  One	  often-­‐cited	  problem	  with	  fMRI	  is	  that	  the	  images	  are	  too	  dazzling,	  that	  is,	  that	  they	  cloud	  readers’	  judgment	  and	  mask	  the	  technology’s	  limitations.	  	  As	  early	  as	  the	  1990’s	  neuroimaging	  has	  been	  described	  with	  the	  word	  “seductive”	  (Sarter,	  Berntson	  &	  Cacioppo,	  1996,	  p.	  13;	  Ratcliff,	  1998,	  p.	  129;	  see	  also	  Brammer,	  2003,	  p.	  373;	  Check,	  2005,	  p.	  254;	  Gerard	  &	  Peterson,	  2003,	  p.	  13;	  Gordon,	  2001,	  p.	  104;	  Marks,	  2010,	  p.	  4;	  Merckelbach,	  Devilly,	  &	  Rassin,	  2002,	  p.	  492;	  Illes,	  De	  Vries,	  Cho,	  &	  Schraedly-­‐Desmond,	  2006,	  p.	  W27).	  	  William	  Uttal	  (2011),	  a	  vocal	  critic	  of	  functional	  neuroimaging	  research	  in	  psychology,	  asserts	  “Their	  charm,	  their	  novelty,	  and	  their	  pictorial	  splendor	  tend	  to	  overwhelm	  critical	  consideration…”	  (p.	  21).	  	  Whereas	  Roskies	  (2010)	  cautiously	  observes	  “Neuroimages	  are	  epistemically	  compelling:	  They	  invite	  us	  to	  believe”	  (p.	  195),	  more	  pointed	  references	  to	  this	  problem	  come	  from	  Bloom	  (2006)	  who	  writes	  of	  “fMRI’s	  seductive	  but	  deceptive	  grasp	  on	  our	  attentions”	  (para.	  6)	  and	  Crawford	  (2008)	  who	  refers	  to	  neuroimaging	  as	  “that	  fast-­‐acting	  solvent	  of	  critical	  faculties”	  (p.	  65).	  	  According	  to	  Poole	  (2012),	  “the	  [fMRI]	  pictures,	  like	  religious	  icons,	  inspire	  uncritical	  devotion”	  (para.	  18).	  	  	   What	  is	  the	  evidence	  for	  the	  seductive	  allure	  of	  brain	  imaging?	  	  The	  most	  frequently	  cited	  findings	  come	  from	  two	  articles	  published	  in	  2008.	  	  McCabe	  and	  Castel	  (2008)	  assessed	  the	  effects	  of	  functional	  brain	  images	  on	  the	  perceived	  quality	  of	  cognitive	  neuroscience	  research.	  	  Using	  both	  fictional	  research	  descriptions	  and	  a	  real	  science	  news	  article,	  they	  documented	  higher	  ratings	  of	  credibility	  when	  the	  texts	  were	  accompanied	  by	  functional	  brain	  images	  compared	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bar	  charts,	  topographical	  maps	  of	  scalp-­‐recorded	  EEG,	  or	  no	  image.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  a	  hypothetical	  study	  entitled	  “Watching	  TV	  is	  related	  to	  Math	  Ability”	  the	  result	  of	  interest	  was	  that	  both	  TV	  watching	  and	  arithmetic	  evoked	  activation	  in	  the	  temporal	  lobe.	  	  The	  conclusion	  of	  the	  study,	  which	  subjects	  were	  to	  evaluate,	  was	  that	  TV	  watching	  could	  improve	  math	  skills.	  	  Subjects	  did	  so	  after	  reading	  a	  description	  of	  the	  study	  and	  results	  accompanied	  by	  either	  a	  bar	  chart	  or	  a	  brain	  image.	   	  	   McCabe	  and	  Castel	  describe	  the	  illustrations	  used	  in	  these	  two	  conditions	  as	  “informationally	  equivalent,”	  but	  this	  was	  not	  strictly	  true.	  	  Figure	  1	  shows	  the	  sample	  stimuli	  that	  they	  included	  in	  their	  article,	  used	  to	  illustrate	  the	  hypothetical	  research	  on	  TV	  and	  math.	  	  The	  bar	  chart	  shows	  total	  temporal	  lobe	  activation,	  whereas	  the	  3-­‐D	  rendering	  of	  the	  brain	  shows	  specific	  regions	  of	  activation	  in	  the	  temporal	  lobe	  including	  both	  the	  shape	  and	  location	  of	  the	  activated	  areas	  within	  the	  temporal	  lobe.	  	  Given	  that	  the	  scientific	  argument	  in	  the	  accompanying	  text	  was	  based	  on	  the	  similarity	  of	  brain	  activation	  across	  the	  two	  conditions,	  the	  similarly	  shaped	  and	  located	  splotches	  of	  activation	  in	  the	  brain	  images	  do	  in	  fact	  provide	  more	  information	  than	  the	  equivalent	  total	  temporal	  lobe	  activation	  in	  the	  bar	  chart.	  The	  authors	  also	  compared	  fMRI	  brain	  images	  to	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  data	  representation,	  a	  topographic	  map	  of	  the	  kind	  used	  to	  represent	  scalp	  distributions	  of	  electric	  potential	  in	  EEG	  and	  ERP	  research.	  	  The	  latter	  was	  a	  circular	  map	  of	  the	  head,	  with	  21	  electrode	  sites,	  and	  color-­‐coded	  gradations	  of	  interpolated	  activity.	  	  Although	  such	  representations	  include	  somewhat	  more	  specific	  information	  about	  the	  shape	  and	  location	  of	  brain	  activity	  than	  bar	  charts	  of	  lobe-­‐wide	  activity,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  signals	  they	  depict	  (scalp	  recordings	  from	  widely	  spaced	  electrodes)	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includes	  much	  less	  specificity	  than	  fMRI.	  	  For	  purposes	  of	  evaluating	  the	  persuasiveness	  of	  conclusions	  that	  rest	  on	  evidence	  of	  common	  anatomical	  substrates,	  this	  difference	  is	  relevant.	  	  Thus,	  like	  the	  bar	  charts,	  the	  maps	  are	  not	  informationally	  equivalent	  to	  fMRI.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  subjects	  should	  find	  them	  more	  persuasive,	  because	  of	  the	  information	  they	  convey,	  not	  their	  seductive	  allure.	  The	  other	  study	  that	  is	  sometimes	  cited	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  seductive	  allure	  of	  imaging	  did	  not	  actually	  study	  the	  effect	  of	  brain	  images.	  	  Weisberg,	  Keil,	  Goodstein,	  Rawson,	  and	  Gray	  (2008)	  set	  out	  to	  examine	  the	  effect	  of	  neuroscience	  information	  on	  the	  perceived	  quality	  of	  explanations	  of	  psychological	  phenomena.	  	  They	  found	  that	  poor	  explanations	  for	  psychological	  phenomena	  were	  rated	  as	  more	  convincing	  when	  accompanied	  by	  irrelevant	  neuroscience	  information.	  	  Although	  some	  of	  the	  “With	  Neuroscience”	  explanations	  referred	  to	  brain	  imaging,	  no	  images	  were	  presented	  to	  subjects.	  	  In	  addition,	  Weisberg	  et	  al.	  point	  out	  that	  their	  results	  are	  “not	  necessarily	  limited	  to	  neuroscience	  or	  even	  to	  psychology.	  Rather,	  people	  may	  be	  responding	  to	  some	  more	  general	  property	  of	  the	  neuroscience	  information	  that	  encouraged	  them	  to	  find	  the	  explanations	  in	  the	  With	  Neuroscience	  condition	  more	  satisfying”	  (p.	  476).	  Despite	  their	  limitations,	  these	  two	  studies	  from	  2008	  have	  been	  cited	  hundreds	  of	  times	  in	  subsequent	  years	  as	  proof	  of	  brain	  images’	  power	  to	  overwhelm	  our	  judgment.	  	  Surprisingly	  little	  additional	  evidence	  has	  been	  published	  in	  support	  of	  the	  disproportionate	  persuasiveness	  of	  brain	  images.	  Specifically,	  to	  our	  knowledge	  only	  one	  subsequent	  published	  study	  has	  reported	  effects	  of	  functional	  brain	  images	  on	  ratings	  of	  scientific	  credibility,	  and	  this	  study	  did	  not	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compare	  ratings	  with	  and	  without	  images:	  Keehner,	  Mayberry,	  and	  Fischer	  (2011)	  contrasted	  ratings	  of	  research	  credibility	  for	  five	  different	  types	  of	  functional	  brain	  images	  (glass	  brain,	  axial	  slice,	  3-­‐D	  brain,	  inflated	  brain	  and	  ERP	  scalp	  topography).	  	  Effects	  of	  rated	  image	  complexity,	  realism,	  3-­‐dimensionality	  and	  familiarity	  were	  examined,	  and	  only	  3-­‐dimensionality	  was	  observed	  to	  have	  a	  significant	  effect	  (uncorrected	  for	  multiple	  comparisons).	  Other	  recent	  studies	  have	  failed	  to	  replicate	  the	  effect	  of	  functional	  brain	  images	  on	  judgments	  of	  research.	  	  Gruber	  and	  Dickerson	  (2012)	  performed	  an	  experiment	  much	  like	  McCabe	  &	  Castel’s	  (2008),	  asking	  subjects	  to	  rate	  the	  quality	  of	  reasoning	  and	  other	  aspects	  of	  a	  science	  news	  article,	  comparing	  the	  effects	  of	  a	  brain	  image	  relative	  to	  no	  image	  and	  relative	  to	  other	  types	  of	  images.	  	  They	  report	  finding	  no	  significant	  effects	  of	  image	  type	  on	  subjects’	  ratings.	  	  Two	  series	  of	  as	  yet	  unpublished	  experiments	  have	  failed	  to	  find	  evidence	  for	  the	  seductive	  allure	  of	  brain	  images.	  	  Michael,	  Newman,	  Vuorre,	  Cumming,	  and	  Garry	  (2012,	  under	  review)	  reported	  a	  series	  of	  replication	  attempts	  using	  McCabe	  &	  Castel’s	  Experiment	  3	  materials.	  Across	  nearly	  2000	  subjects,	  a	  meta-­‐analysis	  of	  these	  studies	  and	  McCabe	  &	  Castel’s	  original	  data	  produced	  a	  miniscule	  estimated	  effect	  size	  whose	  plausible	  range	  includes	  a	  value	  of	  zero.	  Our	  own	  work	  (Hook	  &	  Farah,	  in	  preparation)	  has	  also	  failed	  to	  find	  evidence	  that	  brain	  images	  enhance	  readers’	  evaluation	  of	  research	  in	  three	  experiments	  comprising	  a	  total	  of	  988	  subjects.	  	   Given	  the	  paucity	  of	  published	  support	  for	  the	  seductive	  allure	  hypothesis,	  the	  weaknesses	  in	  that	  support,	  and	  the	  recent	  null	  results,	  it	  is	  remarkable	  that	  the	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hypothesis	  has	  persisted.	  	  Why	  might	  this	  be?	  	  There	  are	  many	  possible	  answers,	  not	  mutually	  exclusive.	  First,	  the	  idea	  of	  seductive	  allure	  lends	  support	  to	  the	  widely	  held	  concern	  that	  the	  behavioral	  sciences	  are	  being	  deprived	  of	  funding	  in	  favor	  of	  brain	  imaging	  research	  (Bloom,	  2006;	  Fodor,	  1999;	  Miller,	  2010;	  Weisberg,	  2008).	  	  Although	  we	  agree	  that	  behavioral	  science	  research	  is	  underfunded,	  the	  seductive	  allure	  of	  brain	  imaging	  is	  not	  likely	  to	  be	  the	  reason.	  In	  addition,	  given	  the	  visual	  appeal	  of	  images	  and	  their	  high-­‐tech	  origins,	  the	  idea	  that	  they	  are	  inordinately	  persuasive	  is	  plausible.	  	  This	  a	  priori	  plausibility	  may	  have	  reduced	  scrutiny	  of	  the	  experimental	  designs	  and	  results	  that	  seem	  to	  support	  it.	  	  Finally,	  publication	  bias	  may	  have	  played	  a	  role	  by	  preventing	  us	  from	  learning	  of	  negative	  results	  from	  other,	  possibly	  better	  controlled,	  studies.	  	  As	  the	  blogger	  Neuroskeptic	  wrote	  in	  2009	  concerning	  Weisberg	  et	  al.’s	  (2008)	  study,	  there	  is	  “another	  kind	  of	  seductive	  allure,	  probably	  the	  oldest	  and	  most	  dangerous	  of	  all—the	  allure	  of	  that	  which	  confirms	  what	  we	  already	  thought	  we	  knew.”	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